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Back to the Future: A Willingness
to Play Reexamined
William E. Martin
As the Central Arizona Project is being completed and contracts  are being negotiated,
economic  analysis continues  to show that neither agriculture  nor municipalities would
benefit from the project if repayment actually is required  according  to previously
suggested schedules. Earlier  analyses were either ignored  or condemned  as farmers
were willing  to play a water development  game in the face of uncertain future
repayment requirements.  The game  of playing  for subsidized water  continues even  as
the buyers now face real costs rather than just some  future possibility  of incurring
costs. Recent analysis is being used to help negotiate  favorable  delivery and
repayment contracts.  Experience has shown that once the physical development  is in
place,  costs are negotiable.
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Six years ago in this Journal, Martin, Ingram,
and Laney developed the concept  of "willing-
ness to play" the water development game. For
years, Arizona farmers have supported  a plan
to bring additional  surface  water  to Arizona
despite  the  potential  enormous  repayment
costs. The farmers were ignoring the potential
costs  for which  they had  no particular  "will-
ingness to pay" and were simply keeping their
options open at no cost.
Other authors have documented the general
experience  that  once  water  actually  is  con-
veyed to a community, local interests will have
a great deal of control over the conditions and
amount  of  project  repayment  (e.g.,  Young
1978;  Maass  and  Anderson;  Mille  and  Un-
derwood). In Arizona, the new water currently
is beginning to be available and payment has
become  a  real  issue.  In  this  article  the con-
tinuing game is examined.
History of the Project
The Central Arizona  Project, currently  under
construction by the  U.S. Bureau of Reclama-
tion, will  develop  the  last remaining  surface
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water supply available to the state. The project
will transport an allotted  1.2 million acre-feet
of Colorado River water from Arizona's west-
ern border to the central agricultural and met-
ropolitan  areas.'  Water  reaching  the Tucson
area,  at the terminus  of the  canal,  will  have
traveled  300  miles  and been  pumped  2,000
feet uphill through a series of fourteen pump-
ing plants. Construction is nearing completion.
Some water has already been delivered to the
Phoenix area. Water should reach the Tucson
area by  1991.
The project has been a long time in coming.
It was conceived  originally in the early  1920s
as  a way to develop  Arizona  through expan-
sion  of agricultural  acreage.  But, by the time
of its authorization in 1968, the declining water
table in the groundwater  pumping areas of the
state had turned it into an agricultural  rescue
project.  No  new areas  of land  could be  irri-
gated, but agriculture  would be "rescued"  by
having surface water to use instead of ground-
water  that was  perceived  as  becoming  more
expensive  as  the  groundwater  table  fell.  An
important  condition  in the  authorization  act
was that for every acre-foot of CAP water de-
The canal is being built with an annual capacity of 2.0 million
acre-feet.  Arizona's unused  allotment from the Colorado River is
1.2 million  acre-feet. More water actually will be available in the
early years  of project,  and less will be available later.
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livered  for  irrigation,  one  less  acre-foot  of
groundwater  could be pumped.
By the late 1970s the CAP was being viewed
more and more as a rescue project for the grow-
ing nonagricultural  economy.  Agriculture will
still  be  a water  recipient,  but the  quantities
received will  be reduced  as the state's popu-
lation grows.  Under  the current  plan,  in the
early years  of the  project  much of the water
will be delivered to agriculture  since there will
be too much water available to be all used by
nonagriculture. In the later years of the project,
as municipal and industrial uses grow, a much
smaller quantity  will be  available  for irriga-
tion. Individual irrigation districts will not own
a  given water quantity but will contract  for a
percentage of the water declared to be available
for  agriculture.  The  total  agricultural  alloca-
tion will decline over time.
Farmers in the state  always have been loyal
supporters  and advocates of the project.  They
remained  so  despite  economic  analyses  (and
widespread publicity about those analyses)  in
1967 (Young and Martin),  1973 (Kelso,  Mar-
tin, and Mack),  and 1977 (Boster and Martin),
showing that farmers would be better off eco-
nomically without the project.  In  1967, they,
as well  as others,  were  so incensed about the
Young and Martin analysis that the then dean
of the College  of Agriculture arranged to have
the analysis rebutted in the state's newspapers
in an effort to "save" the university and college
(Arizona Daily Star). These were  analyses  of
costs  and benefits  to Arizona  farmers  them-
selves, not analyses of national economic ben-
efits. A problem  with all of these analyses was
that they were based on projected (i.e.,  hypo-
thetical)  prices  of CAP  water to  the  farmers
and were not specific  to a particular irrigation
district with that district's specific conditions.
The  support  by  farmers  of the project  led
Martin,  Ingram,  and  Laney  to  study  the
farmers'  perceptions,  motivations,  and access
to  information.  Their  conclusions  were  that
farmers simply had a "willingness to play" the
water  development  game.  After  all,  even  in
1980 at the time of  the survey, although a num-
ber of districts had engaged consultants to de-
sign  and  estimate  costs  for distribution  sys-
tems, no final water allocations had been made
and no  irrigation  district or farmer  contracts
had been signed.  They  concluded by positing
the rules  of the game.  "Basically  the  game is
simply to keep your options open.  As long as
the costs of doing so are minimal and there is
possibility of  benefit in the future, farmers need
not take action now to avoid uncertain future
costs. Even if future developed water costs pre-
sumably will be greater than it would be eco-
nomically rational for them to pay, experience
has shown them that once the physical devel-
opment is in place,  the cost of the water will
be negotiable"  (Martin, Ingram, and Laney, p.
139).
While  the rules were  posited based  on ob-
servation  of farmers'  behavior,  recent  obser-
vations (to be discussed later) indicate that po-
tential municipal and industrial (M and I) users,
who  also  have  been  firm  project  advocates,
also can play the game.
Current Status of the  Project
On 24  March  1983,  the "final"  water  alloca-
tions to applicants for the new water were pub-
lished in the Federal  Register. M and I appli-
cants  and Indian  reservations,  were  assigned
actual quantities to be available in various time
periods. Agricultural applicants were assigned
percentages of what would be left over,  given
supply  variability.  In  years of shortage,  each
agricultural  allocation would be reduced  pro-
portionately  before  the  M  and  I  and  Indian
allottees had their allotments reduced.  An ini-
tial contracting  period of six months was set,
until October  1984, to sign contracts with the
repayment agency,  the Central Arizona Water
Conservation  District (CAWCD)-a three
county district which buys the water from the
bureau and subcontracts with the actual users.
The CAWCD actually sets the water prices and
has a general property taxing authority.
In the CAWCD subcontracts, repayment  of
construction costs by agricultural users was set
at  $2 per acre-foot,  with  operations,  mainte-
nance,  and repair  (0,  M, and  R)  costs  to be
paid by all  users at the current  actual cost to
the bureau in each year. M and I user contracts
were not yet available,  but M and I users were
to be allocated a much higher construction cost,
and  raw water  was  expected  to  cost  at  least
$100 per acre-foot (Martin et al.).
The  1984  Bureau of Reclamation  estimate
for the canal-side  delivery  of CAP  water for
agriculture, were it available in 1984, was $58
per  acre-foot.  Expected  efficiency  losses  in
transporting the water from the main aqueduct
through local  distribution networks  to the in-
dividual farm headgate ranged from 5%  to 15%.
MartinWestern Journal  of Agricultural Economics
The effective marginal unit cost for CAP water
would therefore  range from about $62  to $67
per acre-foot,  or an average of about $65  per
acre-foot postage  stamp price  at the main  ca-
nal.
The 1984 estimates  of the unit cost of CAP
water were  considerably  above  the  marginal
demand for either supplemental  or substitute
irrigation water in central Arizona.  Only those
farmers for whom the marginal value product
of irrigation was greater than $65 per acre-foot
would want to buy additional supplies of water
via the  CAP.  But buying additional  supplies
will  not  be  legally  permissible.  Only  those
farmers  for whom  the  existing marginal  unit
costs of irrigation water were in excess of $65
an  acre-foot  would  want  to replace  some  of
their  existing  supplies  with  CAP  water.  For
most farmers, both the marginal value product
of water and the current marginal unit cost of
groundwater ranged from $35 to $50. The con-
clusion from this  simple anlaysis was  that at
least  in the  short run,  and  when  considering
only the private costs and returns to irrigation
water  and  disregarding  distribution  system
costs, CAP water could not be used profitably
by most farmers in central Arizona.
But  farmers  were  moving  toward  signing
contracts.  Possibly  they perceived  other eco-
nomic benefits to accure from the substitution
of new  surface water  for groundwater.  Prin-
cipal  among  these potential  external  benefits
could be reductions in the rates of increase of
future  fixed and variable  groundwater  pump-
ing costs and in the level of damages associated
with land subsidence  associated  with a falling
groundwater  table or with associated  deterio-
ration of water quality as the water table fell.2
The CAP might be  economic in the long run
even if it did not appear economic in the short
run.  Using  the  newly  available  pricing  data
from the CAWCD and the consultants'  reports
for the cost of distribution systems, a long-run
analysis including  external costs and benefits,
and  based  on  presumably  firm  price  infor-
mation, was now feasible on an individual ir-
rigation district basis. Details of this analysis
are in Bush and Martin.  Major results are re-
ported  here in order to set the  stage for a de-
scription of the current game being played.
2 Water  quantity is not an issue.  The cost of pumping ground-
water would become prohibitive long before  the aquifer would be
totally depleted.
External Benefits  of Reducing Groundwater
Overdraft
The land subsidence  and water quality  issues
in reality are not important,  regardless of how
they  may  be  perceived  by  many  people  in-
cluding nonfarmers.  McCauley  and Gum  as-
sessed the annual costs  of subsidence-related
damages in western Pinal County, Arizona, an
area  that  has  experienced  some  of the most
severe  groundwater  overdraft  conditions  in
Arizona, and continues to receive  a great deal
of publicity  in  the state  over its  subsidence-
related  problems.  Their estimate  of the total
annual  cost of the repairs for  subsidence-re-
lated damages to land, wells, irrigation ditches,
roads  and  transportation  rights  of way,  and
urban and domestic structures, equaled about
$.50 per acre-foot of overdraft per year in con-
stant  1984  dollars. The  annual marginal  cost
of subsidence  equals  about $.10  per acre-foot
of water per foot of  groundwater decline, clear-
ly a trivial consideration.
It  is  difficult  to  describe  any general  rela-
tionship  in Arizona  between  groundwater
quality and the pumping depth to lift.  Water
quality can vary greatly among different areas
regardless  of the pumping  lifts.  Some  of the
lowest quality water used for irrigation in cen-
tral Arizona comes from some of the shallow-
est wells  (Conovaloff).  Boster and Martin  re-
ported that the estimated salinity of CAP water
would  average  about  940  parts  per  million
(ppm) when deliveries  were to begin in  1986.
Locally the salinity may range from  400 ppm
up to  1,200 ppm, while the area-weighted av-
erage salinity of groundwater  in Pinal County
is 670 ppm. Their conclusions were that water
quality  was  not a  significant  issue,  but CAP
water was  likely  to be  of lower  quality  than
groundwater in most areas. It is clear that there
are confused perceptions about the quality is-
sue  in that  many  people  believe  that  lower
quality is associated with lower water depths;
but again, in reality, reducing the groundwater
overdraft would not improve water quality to
agriculture.
The progressive increase in pumping depths
to lift clearly could be a real source of concern
about  groundwater  overdraft.  The  effects  of
overdraft  on  groundwater  pumping  are  per-
manent and cumulative.  In Bush and Martin
the additional fixed and variable pumping costs
associated with a unit increase in pumping lifts
is represented  by a perpetual stream  of equal
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Table 1.  Estimated Marginal Social  Costs of Groundwater Pumping and Overdraft in the CAP
Service  Area of Central Arizona  in 1984
Projected
Projected  Real Unit
Groundwater  Energy Cost  Estimated
Decline  Unit Energy  Increase  Marginal
Lift  1984-85  Cost  1984-85  Social Pumping
District  (feet)  (feet)  (mills/kwh)  (pct)  Cost ($/af)
Maricopa  County
Harquahala  600  8  52.42  2  122.49
Queen  Creek  600  3  35.00  1  63.99
Tonopah  350  3  52.42  2  66.00
Pima County
Avra Valley  375  3  79.61  2  102.89
Cortaro-Marana
(Cortaro)  120  1  17.00  0  6.83
(Marana)  325  2  17.00  0  17.37
Pinal County
Central Az  620  3  25.00  1  49.74
Hohokam  410  3  25.00  0  30.04
Mar-Stanfld  600  4  36.50  1  68.84
New Magma  600  4  23.00  1  47.08
San Carlos  300  0  25.00  0  17.65
Source:  Bush and Martin.
annual payments, or increased costs.  Changes
in variable  pumping  costs  over  time are  de-
pendent upon  two factors,  the  energy  cost of
pumping and pump maintenance.  Both costs
are functions of the depth to lift.
For example,  in the  Central  Arizona  Irri-
gation District (CAID) the present value of the
additional  variable  pumping costs  associated
with  a  decline  in pumping  lifts  of one  foot,
evaluated  at  4%,  would  be  about  $1.47  per
acre-foot  of groundwater  pumped.  A change
in the real price of energy of 1%, assuming that
groundwater conditions in the CAID remained
static, would be equal to $.2939 per acre-foot,
per foot of lift, equal to a present value of $7.35
per acre-foot.
As pumping lifts increase,  eventually  addi-
tional fixed capital investment is needed. Fixed
cost estimates were developed for pumping lifts
ranging from  200  feet  to  1,000  feet and well
capacities from 800 to 1,600 gallons per min-
ute. Fixed pumping costs appear to increase at
an average rate of approximately $.80 per acre-
foot per additional  50 feet of pumping lift, or
$.016 per acre-foot per additional  foot of lift.
The present value  of the  stream of additional
future  fixed  costs  of an  increase  in pumping
lifts of one foot is equal to $.40 per acre-foot.
Marginal Social Cost of Groundwater
Pumping and Overdraft Compared to the
Variable Cost of the CAP Water
The  marginal  social  cost  (MSC)  of ground-
water pumping and overdraft at any given rate
of pumping is the sum of the private costs of
groundwater  pumping and  the external  costs
of groundwater  overdraft.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the marginal
social cost of groundwater  pumping and over-
draft in most of the major agricultural  irriga-
tion  districts  in  central  Arizona.  Projected
groundwater  declines and real energy cost es-
calations  were  derived  from  examining  his-
torical groundwater records and rate histories
and from conversations with irrigation district
managers.  Because the rate of pumpage is un-
likely to increase in agricultural  areas,  the es-
timates may be considered  conservative.
At an  average variable  cost for CAP water
of about $65  per acre-foot at the main canal
and neglecting any distribution costs from the
canal to the district, only farmers  in the Har-
quahala  Irrigation  District  would  find  CAP
water  cheaper  than  their  private  costs  of
groundwater  pumping.  If farmers  considered
the full  social  cost  of groundwater  pumping,
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the CAP begins to appear competitive in sev-
eral  areas  including  the  Avra  Valley,  Queen
Creek,  Tonopah,  and  Maricopa-Stanfield  ir-
rigation districts.  Elsewhere,  however,  pump-
ing depths to lift and energy costs would have
to be far more severe than they are now before
CAP  water  would  be  less  expensive  than
groundwater. 3
A Long-Run Analysis  of Investing  in the CAP
Comparative  projections  of irrigation  water
costs were made under alternative project and
no-project  conditions for each of seven major
irrigation  districts  planning  to  receive  CAP
water and for which estimates had been made
of the costs of the  necessary distribution  sys-
tems. They are the central Arizona, Hohokam,
Harquahala,  Maricopa-Stanfield,  New  Mag-
ma, Queen Creek, and Tonopah irrigation dis-
tricts. Allocations of CAP water to these seven
districts constitute almost two-thirds of the to-
tal amount of project water designated for non-
Indian agriculture.
The  cost  of  electricity,  the  groundwater
pumping depth to lift, the volumes of ground-
water pumped and CAP water purchased, and
the total fixed costs for groundwater and CAP
water were  varied over  time in  a model  in-
corporating  reasonable  projections.  In  each
year from  1984 to 2034, the weighted-average
total cost of water per acre-foot with and with-
out CAP water were  compared.  The analysis
was run several times for each irrigation  dis-
trict to investigate the sensitivity of the results
to alternative  discount  rates,  energy  cost  es-
calation  rates,  and  rates  of groundwater  de-
cline.
In general,  the progression  of average total
3 It is not of interest to the farmers, but the CAP appears com-
petitive with groundwater in some areas not only because it is free
of the  external costs  associated with  groundwater  overdraft, but
also because it has access to cheaper energy than that available for
most groundwater pumping. Electricity rates from the Navajo Power
Station, the exclusive source of  energy for the CAP, are significantly
lower than the rates paid by  almost all groundwater users in Ar-
izona. The cost of electricity from the Navajo station  in 1984 was
about 20 mills per kilowatt hour (Hine). In contrast, most farmers
in the irrigation  districts  studied paid  between  25  mills  and 75
mills per kilowatt hour for electricity to pump groundwater.
If groundwater were pumped using a power  source as cheap as
that allocated  for  the  CAP,  no  district  would find  the  CAP  an
advantageous  purchase.  Even  in the  Harquahala  Irrigation  Dis-
trict, where  lifts  are increasing  at  the rate  of 8 feet  a  year,  the
marginal social cost of groundwater pumping and overdraft would
be more than $20  an acre-foot less'expensive than the CAP alter-
native.
water  costs over time  under  project  and no-
project conditions  are  as  follows.  During the
early years  of the  project,  CAP water  will be
expensive relative to groundwater. The hydro-
logic  benefits  from  reduced  groundwater
pumping will not be significant  enough to in-
duce  large  savings  in  pumping  costs.  Fixed
pumping  costs  will  actually  be  higher  under
project  conditions  because  of the  underutili-
zation, and hence inefficient use, of the pump-
ing facilities.  Average total water costs there-
fore tend to be higher under project conditions
than they would have  been in the absence  of
the project.
In  later  years,  the  cumulative  hydrologic
benefits  of the project begin to induce  signifi-
cant cost savings in groundwater pumping. In-
creases  in  groundwater  pumping  costs  grow
more slowly as the facilities are used more fully
and, therefore, more efficiently. Meanwhile, the
stability in the variable cost of CAP water con-
tinues to make it a more and more favorable
alternative  to groundwater  pumping. Average
total water costs under project and no-project
conditions  begin to converge.  In some  future
year the  cost paths  cross and water  costs are
thereafter  cheaper  with  the  CAP  than  they
would have been without it.
Whether  the  turnaround  in  average  total
water costs would be significant  and whether
a stream  of positive net benefits  would occur
soon enough in time to generate a positive net
present worth for the CAP was the analytical
question. Results of the fifty-year present-worth
analysis  for  each  of the  seven  irrigation  dis-
tricts  are  shown  in  Bush  and  Martin.  Only
farmers in the Harquahala  Irrigation  District
should expect to realize a positive net benefit
from the CAP. The variable cost of CAP water
will exceed  the variable  cost of groundwater
pumping in every district except two through-
out nearly all of the project planning horizon.
The hydrologic effects of  the CAP will not create
a large savings  in groundwater  pumping costs
early enough  in the project to make much of
a difference.  Groundwater pumping costs will
rise  dramatically  everywhere,  regardless  of
whether  the  CAP  is  in operation  or  not.  In
every  area  the  CAP  will  cause  the  rate  of
groundwater  decline  to  slow,  moderating
pumping costs, but the savings will be no match
for the steadily increasing cost of energy. Even
in the Harquahala  district, where  the savings
in groundwater  pumping lifts will be the great-
est,  the  rising  cost  of energy  dominates  the
trends  in the  variable  cost  of pumping.  The
116  July 1988Willingness to Play  117
principal factor influencing the increasing cost
of groundwater  pumping  is  the cost of elec-
tricity and not the rate of  groundwater decline.
Contract Actions
At the  same time  that  the  Bush and  Martin
analysis was being made, both municipal and
industrial districts and irrigation districts were
signing contracts  with the  CAWCD.  By  July
1984, ten irrigation districts, including the sev-
en  studied, had  signed for 70.7% of the agri-
cultural  allocation  (CAWCD,  21  Oct.  1986).
The Harquahala district signed first for 7.67%
of the total allocation or 10.8%  of the agricul-
tural water accepted.  No additional irrigation
contracts  have  been  signed  since  July  1984.
Seventeen  percent  of the agricultural  alloca-
tions have been declined,  while three districts
have  yet  to  make  up their  minds  about  the
remaining  12%.
By August  1985,  fifty M  and I districts had
signed contracts for 72.6% of their allocation.
The first contracts, including that for Phoenix,
were signed in October 1984. Tucson, presum-
ably the most water-short  M and I area in the
state, was one of the later signers, in February
1985. Tucson and Phoenix together contracted
for 41% of the total allocation. Twenty-seven
percent of the M and I allocation is still avail-
able, part of which has been officially  declined
by entities  to which it was  offered.  Other  en-
tities  have  yet  to  make  up  their  minds
(CAWCD,  21  Oct.  1986).
Playing the Water Game
The irrigation districts were the first to be of-
fered contracts by the CAWCD. They had long
been backers of the project, but had done little
analysis  of  its  potential  costs  and  benefits
(Martin, Ingram, and Laney). Even at the time
of signing, their major analytical actions  had
been to hire consultants to investigate how to
build and finance distribution systems as con-
trasted to investigating the economic benefits
and  costs of the systems.  Contracting  ceased
with 29%  of their allocation  still available.
Contracts then were  offered to potential  M
and  I users.  But by January  1984  the  major
potential  M and  I  contractors,  watching  irri-
gation district contracts being signed,  decided
that if agriculture could buy the water at $58
per acre-foot,  they ought to be able to do  so
too (Meissner).  Why should they subsidize ag-
riculture by paying $ 100 or more per acre-foot
when  their current  opportunities  were  about
$45  per acre-foot  for groundwater  in Tucson
and less elsewhere?  In order  to sell the water
the CAWCD agreed to deliver CAP water for
the same price as to agriculture users,  at least
in the  early  years  of the project  (Meissner).
Tucson finally agreed to this price in February
1985  (CAWCD,  21  Oct.  1986).
But water was still available and had finally
begun to flow in the completed part of the canal
from the Colorado River, reaching about half-
way between  Phoenix  and Tucson. The CAP
aqueduct is being built with a capacity to carry
2  million  acre-feet  of water  per  year-more
than the  legal  allocation  of 1.6 million  acre-
feet. One  and  one-half million  acre-feet  cur-
rently is available  for use.  By October  1986,
water  prices  under  the  signed  contracts  had
fallen to roughly $47  for farmers and $50 for
cities,  to  be  renegotiated  in  1991  when  the
project is to be fully completed (Volante). But
delivery contracts were for only 500,000 acre-
feet.
An 14 October 1986 CAWCD memo stated:
CAWCD has established the overall goal of maximum
utilization of Arizona's  entitlement to Colorado  River
water  through  diverting  and delivering  to  the Project
area as much  CAP water as practicable.  However, it is
anticipated  that during  the  early years  of the Central
Arizona Project operations,  the availability of  Colorado
River  water  will  exceed  the  capability  of CAP  water
users  to directly  use all of the CAP water available.
Due to  water  user's inability  to accept  water  under
prices  reflecting  full operating  conditions  and  the  re-
sultant impact  on CAWCD's  overall goal, CAWCD  is
exploring  price  incentives  as  a  means  of encouraging
early use of project water.
Given  that far more  CAP water was  going
to be available in the near future than holders
of long-term water service subcontractors were
willing to accept,  federal and state authorities
decided  to  attempt  to sell  CAP  water  on  at
least  a temporary basis, not only to those en-
tities who had contracted for long-term service
but to anyone who wished to buy it. The con-
cept  of an "interim"  service  period  was  de-
vised,  where interim  is defined as  the  period
of time between  the beginning of CAP water
deliveries and the declaration by the Secretary
of the Interior that the project is "substantially
complete" (presumably after Tucson starts get-
ting water).
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During  the  interim  period,  surplus  CAP
water will be sold by the CAWCD to anyone
within the service area of  the district who wants
to buy it. These contracts are one-year  agree-
ments,  renewable  at  the  discretion  of  the
CAWCD.  Water  delivered  under  these  con-
tracts will be available  on an "interruptable"
basis only,  i.e.,  it will be  available only  after
all other contractual claims to CAP have been
satisfied. However significant quantities of CAP
water are unallocated and available for deliv-
ery.
The price for CAP water consists of the en-
ergy  costs  for  pumping,  the  operation  and
maintenance  costs,  and  capital  repayment
costs.  During the interim period charges  pre-
sumably will be lower than after project com-
pletion.  Regardless  of the  class  of water  use
(M&I, Indian, or non-Indian agricultural), users
will be charged in the same fashion. The charge
for the energy cost of pumping will be deter-
mined by the user's  location  along the CAP
aqueduct. After the interim period is over,  all
users will be charged a flat rate to include both
operation and maintenance and energy cost of
pumping  charges  regardless  of their  location
along the aqueduct. During the interim-period,
the  full  operation  and  maintenance  cost  has
been declared to be $10 per acre-foot.  Not all
users will pay the full cost.
During the interim period, no capital repay-
ment charges will be assessed against any user
of CAP who  holds a long-term  water service
subcontract.  Users of CAP water who do not
hold long-term water service subcontracts will
be assessed a capital repayment charge  during
the  interim period  only if they do not intend
to use the CAP water to substitute for ground-
water  pumping.  Following  the  end of the in-
terim period,  capital  charges will be assessed
at varying rates,  depending upon  the type of
user. For M and I users, the capital repayment
charge will increase over time.
Energy costs of pumping are determined for
each location along the CAP aqueduct on the
basis of number of pumping stations through
which  the  water  has  to  pass  before  reaching
each particular user. The current schedule var-
ies from $23.50 per acre-foot up to $87.10 per
acre-foot near the canal's terminus. The long-
term  contract price  for CAP water,  excluding
capital  repayment  charges  but  including  the
energy  cost  of pumping  and  operation  and
maintenance charges, will be about $55 to $60
per acre-foot. For locations along the aqueduct
beyond central Pinal County (about two-thirds
of the canal's  total length),  CAP water under
this  interim  plan  would  be  more  expensive
than it would under the standard (long-term)
contracting  arrangements.  But CAP  users  in
southern Pinal County and Pima County either
will  never  buy  CAP  water under  an  interim
contract,  or  else a  different  pricing  structure
will be worked out for them. Water currently
is not available  along this  stretch anyway,  so
the pricing  schedule is basically hypothetical.
The  operation  and maintenance  costs  vary
on a sliding scale up to the "full cost"  of $10
per  acre-foot.  Users  are  given  a price  break
while  they  are  "testing"  their water  delivery
systems and bringing  them up  to full  opera-
tional  level.  Full operational  level  is defined
as either the third year after water service be-
gins or the point at which a cumulative quan-
tity of CAP water  equal to one full  year's al-
location  (otherwise known as the "threshold"
quantity) has been taken, whichever comes first.
From  the beginning of the  third full  year of
water service, users will pay the full O and M
charge  of  $10  per  acre-foot,  regardless  of
whether or not they have already reached their
threshold level of use.
In terms of the water game, this interim pol-
icy illustrates the necessity for the CAWCD to
open  negotiations  with  all  potential  users  of
CAP water-both those who  have contracted
for water and those who have not. The policy
itself is designed to dispose of excess water by
offering  price  concessions  while  appearing to
rigorously  cover  costs.  Thus, the policy  con-
tains language about the full cost of operations
and maintenance and includes relatively high
energy  charges  on the highest  reaches  of the
canal. But full O and M charges are to be phased
in and water is not available in the high-reach
areas anyway.  Presumably  the interim  policy
is to be changed as the canal is completed, but
the precedent  for price  negotiation  has  been
set.
So far the interim policy is not disposing of
a  great  deal  of water.  As of the  summer  of
1987,  two developers  and  an RV  park have
been offered interim contracts for water to use
on their golf courses.  The total quality would
be about  1,200 acre-feet per year.
The water game continues to be played even
as contracts are being signed and water is avail-
able  for delivery.  Although both  agricultural
users and M  and I users declare  that water is
a  scarce  and  "precious"  commodity,  neither
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agriculture  nor M  and I  is willing  to pay the
real marginal  cost.  They are not even willing
to pay  the  highly  subsidized  prices  at  which
the new water is being  offered.  Consequently,
the offer price continues to fall. With the proj-
ect almost complete, the water must be used.
Not to use it would be politically embarrassing
to both state and federal  officials, it would al-
low the California  to continue to use "Arizo-
na's water,"  and would return even less to the
federal treasury than use at a highly subsidized
price.
But the game has become  serious now, par-
ticularly  for  agriculture  where  contract  en-
forcement could result in serious financial dif-
ficulties.  Almost  all  farmers  have  water
available  at  lower  costs  than  the Bureau  of
Reclamation expected the CAWCD to charge.
Only areas with very high energy costs would
find the CAP an attractive alternative for many
years to come at those costs. Even the external
costs  of continued  groundwater  pumping  do
not make the CAP economic.
The author has received reports that the Bush
and Martin bulletin is being shown by farmers
to the CAWCD to support  arguments  for re-
duced  water  cost.  One  farmer  contacted  the
dean of the College of  Agriculture (not the same
dean as in 1967) with the bulletin in his hand.
He  needed  help that neither the dean  or the
author could  supply.  We could  only  counsel
him to continue to talk with his lawyer.  His
entire  farm,  including  Arizona  State  leased
lands as well as his private lands, is within one
of  the irrigation districts studied. The pumping
costs  for  his  wells  range  between  $5.93  and
$15.35  per  acre-foot-far  below  proposed
charges for CAP water. But that difference was
not his main worry.
The main worry was the proposed irrigation
district assessment on both his state and pri-
vate lands of $1,100 per acre in order to build
the distribution system to move the water from
the main CAP canal to the farmers in the dis-
trict.  This  assessment  would  essentially  be
equal to the original value of the land. Further,
by accepting CAP water, he would come under
the Reclamation  Reform  Act of 1982 and be
limited to only 960 acres.
A  letter  to  this  farmer  from  his  attorney
summarizes his dilemma:
My clients have been  quite concerned  about the fact
that they may only have  960  acres which may receive
CAP water. Since the individuals  own 3 to 4 times the
maximum  number  of acres  allowed under  the  Recla-
mation Reform Act of 1982,  we  are  in the  process of
establishing  trusts and  other  devices  to  qualify  addi-
tional land as non excess land.
While I understand that at this point you do not wish
to be  included  in the  Central Arizona  Project  and be
forced to  receive  their water,  it may  be best to try to
preserve your rights for as much irrigable  land as pos-
sible.  Also,  it  is  interesting that  you  will  be  assessed
$1,100.00 per acre for the irrigation system to be placed
on your property while in fact none of the land may be
entitled to CAP water due  to the 960-acre limit.
This farmer has been attempting  to get his
farm  excluded from the irrigation district,  so
far  without  success.  Neither  district  nor
CAWCD officials wish to see any defections.
The potential  effects on repayment  ability on
the district  distribution  system  bonds  is ob-
vious. The  farmer himself sees the specter  of
bankruptcy  if he is  forced  to fulfill  his  con-
tracts.4 The irrigation district president, also a
farmer, is more sanguine. He assured the farmer
that the government  would never  make them
repay the bonds if that would really mean eco-
nomic  difficulties.  The  bonds  are  20%  pri-
vately and 80% federally financed. The 20% is
to be paid off first. The game will require reach-
ing  the  federal  portion  while  still remaining
solvent.
It really is not surprising, however, that many
Arizona  farmers  simply  do  not  believe  that
they will  eventually have to pay the full cost
of the project.  After all, Arizona was the site
of the very first reclamation project when Roo-
sevelt Dam was built to create  the Salt River
Project.  Smith  has  documented  farmer  and
Reclamation Service actions in the mid- 191 Os.
She reports that as the project neared comple-
tion and repayment was to begin, the farmers
suddenly realized that they could not afford to
meet the agreed-upon repayment schedule.  Salt
River Project farmers "joined other water users
nationally  in demanding  a change  in the re-
payment  section  of reclamation  law.  They
wanted not only a different repayment  sched-
ule but also an alternative method of assessing
construction  charges and  greater  federal  sub-
sidy" (p. 93). Farmers had discovered that de-
spite the "lively propaganda of  the early years"
(p.  95),  for  many  farmers  farming  would  be
more expensive with federal reclamation than
4 The  fear  of bankruptcy  due to water contracts is  not only in
this district or even only in Arizona. Farmers in the Dolores Water
Conservation District in southeast Colorado are suing their district
to release  them from contracts signed ten years  ago.  The district
is refusing to do so (U.S.  Water News).
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without it.  Many  farmers  felt "swindled"  (p.
141).  By  1913,  the Secretary of Interior set in
motion  a process to include  project landown-
ers in the decision-making process. The even-
tual outcome  of this processwas that  "for all
intents  and purposes,  in  1917  the  Salt  River
Project belonged to the water users" (p.  145).
Repayment  policy  had  been  substantially
modified. The idea that the Users' Association
should pay only the "proper" cost rather than
the  actual  costs  had  basically  been  accepted
and was the precursor of the more recent rec-
lamation  policy  of farmers  only  reimbursing
the Bureau of Reclamation  according to their
"ability to pay." The repayment period-  at no
interest-was  substantially  extended.  A rein-
terpretation ofreclamation policy allowed prof-
its  from the  sales  of power  generated  by the
project to be used to help pay the general proj-
ect debt including the irrigation facilities.  The
Salt River Project was on its way to being con-
sidered  the  success  it  is  generally  felt  to  be
today.  By  1922,  farmers  were  already  busy
promoting  a  plan  to  bring  Colorado  River
water into central Arizona to expand the  Salt
River Valley  area (Johnson).
With knowledge of the Salt River Valley ex-
perience,  it  is  certain  that  negotiations  over
price  and delivery  conditions  for CAP water
will be continued by both agricultural and mu-
nicipal  users.  As  economists  we  should  not
expect otherwise. The negotiations are simply
an expression of the interaction  of supply and
demand. It is ironical, however,  that while the
earlier economic analyses  were either ignored
or condemned  because  they showed the  CAP
to be uneconomic,  the latest analysis is being
used to support  potential  users'  negotiations
because it shows that farmers cannot afford to
pay their allocated costs.
[Received January  1987; final revision
received April 1988.
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